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FAMILY TRADITION: CUBAN POLICY
REFORM AS RAUL CASTRO TAKES
THE REIGNS
Crystal Jamison
AFTER nearly two years of serving as Cuba's leader, Raul Castro
has implemented revolutionary changes for the country, yet
maintained the ideals of his brother's communist policies.
"Raulism" encompasses a series of economic reforms leading to im-
proved living conditions and ramped up agricultural and industrial capa-
bilities. This paper will evaluate the policies of the past, Raul's current
administration, and the direction he plans to lead the country in. It will
also discuss factors standing to propel and impede the success of the re-
forms, especially Cuba's relations with other countries, particularly within
the western hemisphere. With Congress' support, it appears President
Obama will ease the mandates of the United States' fifty year old eco-
nomic trade embargo with the island; although complete removal of the
ban seems improbable due to the continuation of the Communist govern-
ment structure. While this will surge the island's economy, much more is
needed to ensure the new economic structure prevails, such as a re-
vamped currency system, dependence from foreign aid, and the support
of Cubans who have been faithful to Fidel and his policies for more than
half a century.
While the economic reforms are greatly improving the weathered
county, Raul is not taking the measures necessary to ensure their contin-
ued success, including reestablishing trade with the United States and en-
couraging foreign investment.
I. BRIEF HISTORY OF FIDEL'S COMMUNIST REVOLUTION
In his final days in office, Cuban President Fidel Castro, the founder of
the Communist Revolution, struggled to ensure that the Cuba he had
built would not fade upon his departure after fifty years in command.
Delivering his last major policy speech in November of 2005, Fidel
warned that his generation-the founders of the Communist revolution-
was not going to last much longer and that the new generation's leaders
could destroy the Cuba they had built.' In addressing the mortality of
socialism, Fidel said "[t]his revolution can destroy itself... [w]e can de-
1. Lexington Inst., Issue #26: Will Raul Castro Reform Cuba's Economy? (2007),
http://lexingtoninstitute.org/printer-1177.shtml.
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stroy it, and the fault would be ours."' 2 It is highly unlikely Fidel even
considered the next generation of leaders he had warned of would en-
compass his very own little brother, Raul Castro.
Over fifty years ago, Fidel and his brother led a ragtag rebel force to
improbable victory, seizing control of the Cuban government from
Fulgencio Batista. It was the beginning of his Communist revolution. He
became prime minister of Cuba in 1959 and shortly thereafter canceled
promised elections and suspended Cuba's 1940 constitution, deeming it
outdated. 3 Fidel "systematically and progressively destroyed the funda-
mental human rights of the people on the island."' 4 He proclaimed his
goals as land reform, economic punishment against the United States for
cutting the quota on sugar imports, and transformation of Cuba into a
socialist state.5
During Castro's first nine months in office, approximately 1500 de-
crees, laws, and edicts were passed. 6 With regard to land reform, Fidel
broke up large property holdings and disbursed them to the poor. To do
so, he enacted the Agrarian Reform Act, seizing all agricultural estates
over 165 acres.7 Additionally, the Urban Reform Law essentially made
the government the primary landlord for all residential property by elimi-
nating private sale and rental of homes, transferring property to homeless
Cuban citizens, canceling mortgages, and making all rent and mortgage
payments payable to the state.8 Fidel punished not only the United
States but his own people with the issue of Laws No. 851 and 890, which
allowed him to seize all U.S. corporate property and virtually all Cuban
businesses. 9 He paid no compensation for these government takings de-
spite being required to do so by the laws. Fidel furthered his socialist
agenda with the passage of Law No. 989, making it illegal for Cubans to
leave Cuba and penalizing "those who fled after the revolution by author-
izing state agencies to seize their property." 10 The socialist transforma-
tion was solidified when the Constitution of 1976 was implemented,
which confiscated or expropriated almost all property on Cuba."
2. Id.
3. PBS.Org, Fidel Castro Timeline: Post-Revolution Cuba, http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/
amex/castro/timeline/index.html (last visited Mar. 5, 2009) [hereinafter Timeline].
4. Jose A. Ortiz, The Illegal Expropriation of Property in Cuba: A Historical and
Legal Analysis of the Takings and a Survey of Restitution Schemes for a Post-So-
cialist Cuba, 22 Loy. L.A. INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 321, 322 (2000).
5. Bradley T. Gilmore, U.S.-Cuba Compensation Policy, 8 TEX. Hisp. J.L. & POL'Y
79, 82 (2002).
6. Ted A. Henken, CUBA: A GLOBAL STUDY HANDBOOK 202 (2008).
7. Ortiz, supra note 4, at 329.
8. Eduardo Moises Penalver, Redistributing Property: Natural Law, International
Norms, and the Property Reforms of the Cuban Revolution, 52 FLA. L. REV. 107,
126 (2000).
9. Ortiz, supra note 4, at 332.
10. Kern Alexander & Jon Mills, Resolving Property Claims in a Post-Socialist Cuba,
27 LAw & POL'Y INT'L Bus. 137, 165 (1995).
11. Ortiz, supra note 4, at 332-33.
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Fidel's new Cuba was welcomed by some and distained by others. The
new socialist policies forced many members of the elite and professional
classes into exile. There were Government seizures of properties and
business holdings, the suspension of elections, the militarization of soci-
ety, control of the media, and the politicization of education. 12 His critics
saw him as "a dictator whose totalitarian government systematically de-
nied individual freedoms and civil liberties such as speech, movement[,]
and assembly. ' 13 Nonetheless, supporters admired his ability to dramati-
cally increase the nation's literacy rate and bring quality healthcare to
almost all Cubans.' 4
In furthering his political agenda, Fidel developed the New Man the-
ory, which held that Cubans would no longer work for personal profit,
but for the good of all people. Income and benefits, such as education
and medical services, were to be evenly distributed. Government agencies
represented the people as a whole, without the presence of any political
parties. He ensured loyalty to the regime by having the state control the
press, developing neighborhood watch groups to monitor ideological pu-
rity, and basing work and government promotions on loyalty to Castro.15
The economic policies failed to realize the same success as his political
changes. Fidel's attempt to diversify the Cuban economy, previously al-
most solely based on agricultural production, proved a disaster. Not only
were the Cuban products meant to replace previously imported goods
impractical and of poor quality, but diverting the workers efforts caused
traditional agricultural production to decline and there was a nearly fifty
percent decline in sugar output, the foundation of Cuba's economy. 16
With a renewed focus on agriculture and billions of dollars of financial
aid from Cuba's ally, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR),
Cuba's economy recovered. But this reprieve did not last long either, for
the country was struck with disaster once again when the USSR fell,
sending the island in to an economic crisis. 1 7
Fidel realized dire efforts had to be taken to save the country he had
built. Believing a steady flow of hard currency from abroad would be the
only way to save his regime, he decided to compromise what he had
touted as sacred revolutionary principles. 18 His reform looked to two
sources for the currency: large-scale foreign tourism and dollar remit-
tances from the Cuban diaspora. In July 1993, Fidel began legalizing for-
12. Timeline, supra note 3.
13. Associated Press, Fidel Castro Resigns Cuban Presidency After Half-Century in
Power, FoxNEWS.coM, Feb. 19, 2008, http://www.foxnews.com/story/0,2933,3311
49,00.html [hereinafter Castro Resigns].
14. Id.
15. Mike Williams, Cuba's Neighborhood Watch Groups Remain Active, Cox NEWS
SERVICE, Mar. 9, 2008, http://www.coxwashington.com/reporters/content/report-
ers/stories/2008/03/09/CUBACOMMUNISTS09_COX.html.
16. Timeline, supra note 3.
17. Castro Resigns, supra note 13.
18. Brian Latell, AFTER FIDEL: THE INSIDE STORY OF CASTRO's REGIME AND CUBA'S
NEXT LEADER 238 (2005).
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eign currencies to provide an incentive for Cubans abroad to subsidize
their relatives. While the influx of American dollars helped to some de-
gree, foreign currency was heavily taxed and most of it had to be spent in
government-run stores that charged exorbitant prices for food and other
essentials. The large disparity in the value of the U.S. dollar compared to
the Cuban peso caused a caste system to form: two parallel economies
operating side by side.19 Those with relatives abroad that were able and
willing to send money prospered along with those employed in the tourist
industry that were paid with dollars instead of the state positions receiv-
ing pesos. Racial discrimination reached all time highs since Afro-
Cubans had little to no access to the higher valued currency due to job
discrimination and fewer relatives abroad likely to send the foreign
currency. 20
Similarly, tourism quickly became one of the two principal revenue
sources for the island, but not without severe consequences. Tensions
amongst the supposedly egalitarian society of islanders grew as Fidel
opened Cuba's doors to foreign tourists, as most of the island's own citi-
zens were "banned from the beaches, bars, hotels, and restaurants set
aside for foreign tourists and regime elites."'21
Although the introduction of foreign currency and the accompanied
tourism boom in the late 1990s helped the economy, it was not enough. In
the latter portion of his reign, Cuba was faced with immense social un-
rest. "Crime, drug abuse, and prostitution [] soared, as many Cubans
[saw] greater advantage in hustling foreigners for hard currency than in
pursuing traditional careers. Doctors and physicists drive taxis. Unem-
ployed scientists and engineers wait tables for tips. University enrollment
is less than half what it was in 1990."22 Hostility was further fueled by
"[s]hortages of food and electricity, a deteriorating transportation and
health system, and a drastic decline of basic services provided by the
state. "23
With the intense unrest apparent, Fidel grasped to reaffirm his eco-
nomic policies in any way possible prior to the change of the guards. He
called for an end to the black-market activity, demanding more control
and policing.24 "He threatened to close Cuba's remaining private restau-
rants and [even] to give a 'Christian burial' to private taxis" operating on
the island. 25 Despite the transparency of his attempts to ensure the Cuba
he built lived on, Fidel assured the world he would not step down until
19. Id. at 241.
20. Id. at 240.
21. Id.
22. Id.
23. Eric Driggs, Deteriorating Living Conditions in Cuba (Inst. for Cuban and Cuban-
Am. Stud. U. Miami, Issue 59, 2004), http://ctp.iccas.miami.edu/FOCUSWeb/
Issue59.htm.
24. Lexington Inst., supra note 1.
25. Id.
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death. Unfortunately for Fidel and the loyal Fidel-ists, that did not turn
out to be the case.
II. RAUL AS INTERIM SUCCESSOR
On July 31, 2006, a statement was read on Cuban television explaining
President Fidel Castro would be temporarily relinquishing power due to
medical reasons. 26 It was his first time to renounce his powers as Presi-
dent since taking the office in 1959.27 That statement also announced
that Fidel's brother, Defense Minister Raul Castro, would assume control
of government and the Cuban Communist Party (PCC).28
Prior to stepping down, many considered the most likely political sce-
nario upon Fidel's departure would be Raul taking over as communist
successor. Born in June of 1931, he was considered a member of the re-
form generation. The two brothers were extremely close: expelled from
their first school together, fighting in Cuba's Sierra Maestra together, and
ruling Cuba together for nearly fifty years following their victory over the
forces of Fulgencio Batista.29 Raul had long been involved in the PCC
regime. In fact, Raul was the officially designated successor due to his
role as First Vice President of the Council of State, a position his brother
publicly endorsed.3 0 Furthermore, Raul served as head of the Revolu-
tionary Armed Forced (FAR), which controls Cuba's security apparatus,
making him a very likely candidate. 3'
With this shared background and fervor for the Communist regime, it
surprised many that the brothers' views on the country's economy varied
so vastly. But, at that point in time the revolution was literally in ruins.32
Raul was quick to make the economy his priority, even though he was
only acting as interim leader. He abandoned his brother's call for the
resurgence of his socialist policies. Just four days after his induction into
power, Raul "implemented a series of continuity-based polices and free
flowing economic reforms that [met] a reality test, while instituting a long
modernization process."' 33 He began reintroducing the very reforms




28. Mark P. Sullivan, CRS Report for Congress, Cuba's Political Succession: From
Fidel to Raul Castro (2007), http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/RS22742.pdf.
29. Thomas Catan, Who is Raul Castro, Cuba's New Leader?, TIMESONLINE, Feb. 19,
2008, http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/world/us and-americas/article3396
201.ece?token=null&offset=0.
30. Sullivan, supra note 28.
31. Id.
32. LATELL, supra note 18, at 241.
33. Melissa Penn, The Dynamic Debut of Ratil Castro: Picking up the Broken Pieces,
Council on Hemispheric Affairs, Nov. 4, 2008, available at http://www.coha.org/
2008111/the-dynamic-debut-of-raul-castro-picking-up-the-broken-pieces-of-storm-
battered-but-now-oil-rich-cuba-and-moving-ahead-with-mixed-prospects/.
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Fidel had killed off.34
Raul called for structural changes in order to increase efficiency and
production.35 In an effort to remedy Havana's chronic transportation
problems, he began a process of introducing new buses into the system
with the goal of purchasing a total of 8,000 buses to buoy the country's
public transit.36 He also recognized Cuban salaries were insufficient to
satisfy basic needs. 37 This led Raul to see the reality that his brother's
distain for the black market activities was misplaced. He acknowledged
that the people of his country had to resort to "indiscipline" because they
couldn't make ends meet with the meager salaries of the current econ-
omy-they were not spurred by greed but rather just trying to get a day's
pay for a day's work.38 To curb the need for such indiscipline, Raul or-
dered the government to pay off its debts to small farmers.39 In addition,
he raised the prices the state pays producers for milk and meat.40 Addi-
tionally, Raul established the salary system for the System for Prevention
and Social Attention, which covers workers of the operational, clerical,
service, technical, and management occupational categories. 41
He encouraged private business in direct opposition to his brother.
Rather than 'bury' private taxis, he ordered police to stop harassing them
and allow them to operate without interference. 42 Entrepreneurs were
encouraged to continue operating private restaurants. 43 Raul attempted
to reverse a policy of squeezing out every bit of revenue from visitors,
instead calling for foreign investment.44 He ended abusive pricing at
Cuba's airports in an attempt to make the island a more competitive tour-
ism destination.4 5 Customs regulations were relaxed to allow importation
of home appliances, DVD players, VCRs, game consoles, auto parts, and
televisions. 46
Most importantly for future ramifications, he sought the input of the
country in finding a solution. Raul summoned the party, state enter-
prises, research centers, and other institutions across the country to de-
scribe problems and solutions that would raise output, productivity, and
living standards. 47 Now "thousands of officially-sanctioned meetings
34. Robert Windrem, NBC: How would Raul Castro Govern?, MSNBC, Feb. 19, 2008,
available at http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/14126817/print/1/displaymode/1098.
35. Sullivan, supra note 28.
36. Gregory Reihing, As Revolution Reaches 50, Cuba Under Raul Castro Gradually
Undertakes Reforms, PBS.ORG, Jan. 1, 2009, available at www.pbs.org/newshour/
updates/north-america/jan-june09/cuba01-01.html.
37. Sullivan, supra note 28.
38. Lexington Inst., supra note 1.
39. Sullivan, supra note 28.
40. Id.
41. Resolution 60/2007 (Sept. 3, 2007).
42. Lexington Inst., supra note 1; Sullivan, supra note 28.
43. Lexington Inst., supra note 1.
44. Id.; Sullivan, supra note 28.
45. Lexington Inst., supra note 1.
46. Id.; Sullivan, supra note 28; Joint Resolution 1/2007 (Aug, 24, 2007) (Auto Parts).
47. Lexington Inst., supra note 1.
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[have been] held in workplaces and local Communist party branches
around the country. '48 Cubans are encouraged to air their views and
make suggestions-definitely not characteristic of a Communist regime. 49
Within the first two years of the initiative, his administration had carried
out 215,687 consultations with the public and heard 1.3 million proposals,
involving over five million people. 50 Studies indicate that complaints fo-
cused on low salaries, housing, and transportation problems.51 Other
studies indicate desires to legalize more private business. 52 A concern for
the poor state of the education system was also expressed. 53 Raul began
working on initiatives within these areas.
Although this may have surprised the world, it brought little surprise to
the policy makers of Cuba. "Talk to anyone who worked with Raul Cas-
tro, or anyone clued in to the process that produced Cuba's economic
reforms in the early 1990's, and you get the same story: that he supported
those reforms and is not averse to the use of market mechanisms to im-
prove Cuba's economy. '54 During Fidel's reign, Raul had already begun
using his power as head of the armed forces to revamp the Cuban econ-
omy following the collapse of the Soviet Union. Raul led limited market-
driven initiatives and supported foreign investment through opening the
economy to foreign tourism, to U.S. dollars, and to limited private enter-
prise.55 He also allowed agricultural producers to sell some of their food
to private markets to compensate for the loss of the foreign aid.56
Raul solidified the rumors of his intent to usher in economic change in
a July 26, 2007 speech, a date marking the revolutionary anniversary com-
memorating the 1953 attack on a military facility in Santiago, Chile. 57 His
efforts were long overdue. Cuba's crippled economy was in desperate
need of revitalization. The effect of the trade embargos and long-held
Communist policies, coupled with the impact of the Soviet Union's move
toward democratization and withdrawal of financial support from Cuba
in the 1990s, had become obvious. 58 He noted, "[n]o one, no individual
or country, can afford to spend more than what they have .... To have
more we have to begin producing more."' 59 He, with the help of the peo-
ple, was prepared to collaborate in an attempt to figure out a method to
stimulate the surge in production within the island.
48. Sullivan, supra note 28.
49. Id.
50. Penn, supra note 33.
51. Francis Robles, Cubans Urged to Vent Views, MIAMI HERALD, Oct. 2, 2007.
52. Id.
53. Marc Lacey, At a Fork in the Road, Cuba Follows Two Paths, NY TIMES, July 31,
2008, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2008/07/31/world/americas/31cuba.html.
54. Lexington Inst., supra note 1.
55. Catan, supra note 29.
56. Id.
57. Sullivan, supra note 28.
58. Reihing, supra note 36.
59. Raul Castro, NY TiMES, Mar. 4, 2009, available at http://topics.nytimes.com/top/
reference/timestopics/people/c/raulcastro/index.html.
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III. RAUL'S NEW CUBA
While Raul's assumption of power was announced as temporary, ru-
mors began circulating world wide as to the true state of Fidel's health.
In Miami, spontaneous celebrations broke out amongst Cuban Ameri-
cans as word traveled that Fidel had been hospitalized.60 The informa-
tion line of the county's emergency operations center became a "rumor
hotline" fielding thousands of Castro-related calls. 61 As a Miami-Dade
County spokeswoman reported, "'Eighty percent of the calls are about
his health,' Martinez said. 'Is he alive? Is he dead?"' 62 The fact that
Fidel's initial statement relinquishing power was not delivered personally
drew much conjecture about the true extent of his illness. 63 The ques-
tions circled, "[w]hy isn't he at least doing an audiotape? He's reputed to
have seven doubles. Why aren't they trotting out the doubles?" 64 Specu-
lators were proven wrong however when photos of Fidel were published
in the state-controlled Juventud Rebelde newspaper in August of 2006.
He again quelled the rumors in September of 2007 by making his first
television appearance since the illness. For over a year, the PCC main-
tained that Fidel's health was improving, even assuring that he was play-
ing an active role by authoring essays in the state-run press.65 But, it was
not long until the severity of his illness came out.66 Finally, on February
19, 2008, the ailing eighty-one year old announced he would not be ac-
cepting another term in office.67 He had outlasted eleven U.S. Presi-
dents, serving for nearly half a century. 68
The National Assembly elected Raul president of Cuba by a unani-
mous vote on February 24, 2008.69 Raul had led a successful interim ad-
ministration. He had built a loyal and competent support base that he
relied on heavily on.70 After half a century of exposure to Fidel's autono-
mous style, many feared that Raul's strong dependence on his team
proved that he could not lead on his own. As one critic stated, "[hie has
prospered by being his brother's brother, surrounded by those he sees as
competent and loyal. He is the chairman of the board of this new team,
60. Abby Goodnough, Joy in Miami Turns to Uncertainty over Castro's Fate, NY
TIMES, Aug. 1, 2006. available at http://www.nytimes.com/2006/08/01/world/ameri-
cas/01cnd-miami.html.
61. Laura Parker, Castro's Sister Dismisses Rumors, USA TODAY, Aug. 4, 2006, avail-
able at http://www.usatoday.com/news/nation/2006-08-03-castro-sister-x.htm.
62. Id.
63. Cuba Country Review, supra note 26, at 22.
64. Parker, supra note 61.
65. Sullivan, supra note 28.
66. Cuba Country Review, supra note 26, at 22.
67. U.S.: No Quick Cuba Policy Change, USA TODAY, Feb. 19, 2008, available at
http://www.usatoday.com/news/world/2008-02-19-bush-cubaN.htm [hereinafter
No Quick Change].
68. Raul Castro, NY TIMES, Mar. 4, 2009, http://topics.nytimes.com/top/reference/
timestopics/people/c/raulcastro/index.html [hereinafter Raul Castro].
69. Gregory Reihing, As Revolution Reaches 50, Cuba Under Raul Castro Gradually
Undertakes Reforms, PBS, Jan. 1, 2009, available at www.pbs.org/newshour/up-
dates/northamerica/jan-june09/cuba_01-01.html.
70. Windrem, supra note 34.
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more of an orchestrator. ' 7 1 Raul's ruling style was soon tested.
With the country on the brink of what seemed to be an economic
epiphany, Raul suffered a major setback. Just months after officially tak-
ing the reigns, Cuba was struck by two Caribbean hurricanes, Ike and
Gustav, devastating the island and its economic growth.72 The tragedy
only exacerbated a modern history of food shortages, which already
forced Cuba to depend heavily on food imports to feed its people. Ex-
perts estimate the hurricanes caused $3-5 billion in damages, with an es-
pecially hard impact on the country's nickel and sugar industries as well
as tourism industry.7 3
Despite the destruction, Raul remained unyielding in seeking reforms
to rebuild his nation. He looked to the Chinese political-economic model
in shaping his reforms.7 4 The model focused on opening up Cuba's econ-
omy without giving up rigid one-party political control. 75 Focus remained
on three main areas: the agricultural sector, repairing the damaged infra-
structure, and encouraging spending.
A. AGRICULTURAL SECTOR
Raul has long demonstrated support for opening up farmers' markets,
even leading efforts in the early 1990s to decentralize foreign trade to
counter the economic losses resulting from the withdrawal of Soviet aid.
He led the movement giving state and private enterprises, joint ventures,
and international economic associations direct access to external mar-
kets.76 The island has long suffered from food shortages for its 11,000
citizens, resulting in $2 billion now spent on food imports.77 In fact, in
2006, $340 million in food and agricultural products were bought from the
United States.7 8 With Raul's renewed focus on "meeting the basic needs
of the population," his initiatives to bring that number down grew even
stronger. 79
Most citizens blamed the major food scarcity on the excessive state in-
tervention and control of the agricultural sector.80 Since 1962, the state-
run Union Nacioinal de Acopio (UNA) has served as the official link
between producers and consumers farm production. 81 Cuban farmers are
71. Id.
72. Penn, supra note 33.
73. Id.
74. LATELL, supra at 18.
75. Raul Castro, supra note 68.
76. CubaINdustria, Organizacions Rectoras de Normalizacion, http://
www.cubaindustria.com/English/comerext infrageneral.htm.
77. Reihing, supra note 36.
78. U.S.-Cuba Trade & Econ. Council, Inc., Economic Eye on Cuba: 2006 Export Sta-
tistics for Cuba (2007) http://www.cubatrade.org/CubaExportStatsA.pdf.
79. Penn, supra note 33.
80. Alejandro L. Sarria, The Future of Public Procurement Law in Cuba: Why the
UNCITRAL Model Law is Havana's Best Option, 37 PUB. CON. L. J. 89 (2007).
81. Jose Alvarez, Acopio: Cuba's State Procurement and Distribution Agency 4, (Univ.
of Fla. Inst. Of Food & Agric. Scis., 2004), available at http://edis.ifas.ufl.edu/
FE484.
900 LAW AND BUSINESS REVIEW OF THE AMERICAS [Vol. 15
required to deliver quotas of produce, which are subject to price controls,
to a government collection point each week where officials gather the
harvest.82 UNA then takes the fruit and vegetables to produce ware-
houses or authorized distribution points. 83 The quota distribution scheme
results in un-harvested crops estimated to be as high as 225 kilograms per
hectare.84 Furthermore, reports estimate "that food stored in Cuban
warehouses for one to three months was found to suffer losses from ro-
dents of about 1%."85
With state-run distribution of agricultural goods, farmers have little in-
centive for further self-development. To encourage the sector, Raul has
doubled and at times tripled the price the state will pay for farm products
since taking office in 2006.86 He is also providing farmers with the
purchasing power to buy essential supplies so that crops don't go unculti-
vated due to shortages in the rationed supplies, which are distributed
through the government-regulated system. 87 He also gave farmers the
freedom to use state issued CUC pesos to cover anticipated additional
costs of production such as seeds, fertilizer, herbicides, tools, ropes, and
gloves. 88
He decided to put vacant farmlands back in private hands by issuing a
decree giving private farmers and cooperatives the right to develop up to
100 acres of unused government-owned land. 89 Raul's implementation of
Law Decree 259 on July 18, 2008, not only carries significant benefits for
the Cuban economy and the country's farmers; it helps the world alike.
Decree 259 is an agricultural sustainability development policy allowing
Cuban farmers to expand and diversify production through means
"rooted in an ecological rationality." 90 It "was directed to the use of or-
ganic fertilizers, soil conservation procedures and the creation of local
cooperatives, community environmental programs, land redistribution
strategies, as well as a decentralization of government control." 91 As a
result of these initiatives, the balance in ownership of farmlands virtually
inverted itself. Farmers now control eighty-five percent of the total farm
acreage, while prior to Raul taking office the state maintained ownership
of eighty percent.92
82. Sarria, supra note 80.
83. Id.
84. Id.
85. Alvarez, supra note 81.
86. Penn, supra note 33; Fiona Govan, Raul Castro Lifts Ban on Cubans Building
Their Own Homes, TELEGRAPH, Jan. 5, 2009, http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/
worldnews/centralamericaandthecaribbean/cuba/4126471/Raul-Castro-lifts-ban-
on-Cubans-building-their-own-homes.html.
87. Penn, supra note 33.
88. Id.
89. Reihing, supra note 69.
90. Penn, supra note 33.
91. Id.
92. Id.
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B. REBUILDING THE INFRASTRUCTURE
In January of 2009, Raul lifted the ban on Cubans building their own
homes, mainly in response to the country's housing shortage crisis.93 Un-
til that point, the construction of homes was the responsibility of the gov-
ernment.94 The government, however, failed the three years prior in
fulfilling its annual goal of building 10,000 new homes.95 Compounding
the problem, the hurricanes had leveled over half-a-million homes.96 It is
estimated that between 500,000 and a million new homes are now needed
to end the shortage. 97 Thus Cubans are now permitted to obtain the title
to a state-owned home as well as to build their own homes using private
means.98 Strict guidelines remain in effect as to the dimensions of pro-
posed new dwellings.99 That does not mean that the shortage will soon
cease either. There is a chronic shortage of building materials and mater-
ials such as sand, stone and iron are only available on the black market
leaving state supplied cement the only viable alternative. 100 Fidel main-
tained such strong restrictions on private property policies because his
fear that it reduced his political control over Cubans. 10 1 "It is hard for
people to rebel against the government when it is the country's sole em-
ployer. '' 10 2 The private enterprise will hopefully eliminate chronic
shortages the government cannot provide its people, but it does come
with a price in the communist regime.103 Raul has opted to forego the
dangers with officials telling the Associated Press there will be several
new housing reforms to follow. 104
Despite the weakened socialist infrastructure, Cuba's healthcare sys-
tem is in need of no reform. The socialized system is touted as one of the
best health care systems in the Caribbean, with many qualified physicians
and availability to all citizens. 10 5 As a result, life expectancy rates have
risen tremendously for Cubans, with an estimate of eighty years for fe-
males and seventy-five years for men currently living. 10 6 This has not
come without a price. The increase in life expectancy has led to Cuba's
version of unfunded pension liabilities. In response, Raul was forced to
93. Reihing, supra note 36.
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enact a new social security law. Permitted retirement ages were increased
from fifty-five for women to sixty and for men from sixty to sixty-five. 107
The problem has been felt universally but is felt harder in Cuba due to
the lack of a reliable economic growth path for the country that is inde-
pendent of external subsidies.' 0 8 Despite economic difficulties, Raul
raised the minimum pension for retired Cubans to the equivalent of $8.33
per month, a decision made by the people. 10 9 The July 2008 National
Assembly session enacted a preliminary bill but it was not enacted until a
reported 99.1% of 3,057,568 assembly participants convened to discuss
and approve it.10
Raul has acknowledged "shortcomings" in the country's educations
system, which ranks fifty-first against the world.' 1 Many teachers have
sought other, higher paying jobs than the less than twenty dollars a month
equivalent position, leaving the island with a deficit of 8,000 teachers. 112
In response, Raul announced new incentives to lure retired teachers back
to classrooms, a vilification of his brother's policy nearly a decade ago
attempting to use high school graduates as makeshift teachers. 113 "Our
schools have fallen in a hole," said one twenty-year-old teaching veteran
who left the classroom to work in a beauty salon where she would receive
higher pay. 114 He also negotiated the Cooperation Agreement between
the Governments of Honduras and Cuba, a cooperative effort to provide
education and professional training through projects and programs in
which public and private entities of both countries will participate.11 5
C. ENCOURAGE SPENDING
Another initiative of reforms was passed in the spring of 2008 in an
effort to boost the economy through encouraging spending. Effective
April 1, 2008, Raul lifted the long-term ban on purchasing electronic
goods including computers, mobile phones, microwave ovens, and car
alarms. 116 Additionally, he brought an end to the "tourism apartheid"
previously in effect. 11 7 Previously, car rentals and hotel stays were per-
mitted only by foreigners.11 8 The policy was meant to prevent the island-
ers from communicating with foreigners in a country where information
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is tightly controlled.119 Raul lifted this ban effective April 1, 2008, ending
the "tourism apartheid". 120 Although the people welcomed the removal
of the strict restraints, it has had little impact. Few Cubans can afford
visits to luxury hotels or car rentals on their meager average state salary
of nineteen dollars a month. 121
Despite the implementation of these policies, many feel the progress is
too slow. Ninety percent of the economy is still dominated by the public
sector.122 A recent survey taken almost a year after Raul assumed com-
plete control reveals ninety-two percent of Cubans feel unaffected by the
policy changes Raul Castro has instituted.123 The changes, however, have
not gone completely unnoticed. Tony Zamora, a lawyer and frequent Cu-
ban traveler as a veteran of the 1961 Bay of Pigs, said on his last trip he
went to a place he frequents on his trips to buy a SIM card for his cell
phone and "there were 42 people in line. I couldn't believe it.1 2 4
Though the changes may seem modest at this point, they are gradually
leading to the decentralization of the government, something Cuba has
not experienced in half a decade. There are also hints that the business
sector is beginning to open. It is imperative that promoters of the eco-
nomic reforms do not feel they have their job is complete based on the
recent prosperity the Cuban economy is experiencing as much of it is
attributable to other sources, especially within its energy sector. Revised
reports show Cuba is now expected to have double the previously esti-
mated offshore oil deposits, which would make it one of the twenty larg-
est oil powers in the world.1 25 This is certainly generating added
excitement and interest. Likewise, with the financial aid of China, Cuba
has been able to begin rebuilding a new and improved power grid after
the devastation of the hurricanes. Over 180 hydroelectric power plants
have been built in Cuba, restoring electricity to a majority of the ad-
versely affected regions of the country and allowing operations to recom-
mence.12 6  While Cuba is currently reaping the benefit of these
investments, the Chinese may pull out at any time on the construction of
future plants. In order for the reform to succeed, Raul and his team must
not lose momentum nor allow these outside sources to distract them from
their economic agenda.
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IV. POLITICAL FRONT
Unlike the monumental advances on the economic front, the tightly
controlled political repression is not likely to experience any changes.
There are two key components of the China Model. First, the govern-
ment mimics successful elements of liberal economic policy by opening
up much of the economy to foreign and domestic investment, allowing
labor flexibility, keeping the tax and regulatory burden low, and creating
a first-class infrastructure through a combination of private sector and
state spending. The second part is to permit the ruling party to retain a
firm grip on government, the courts, the army, the internal security appa-
ratus, and the free flow of information. 127
The economic growth allows the people to prosper and keeps them
happy with the ruling regime despite the lack of democracy.
The system is characterized by a strong security mechanism and carries
stiff repercussions for dissidents.128 Raul, as previously deemed "the
Prussian," is known as a widely feared hard-liner, especially when it
comes to persecution of such dissidents, and it is not anticipated that rep-
utation will change any time soon. 129 Instead, Raul is predicted to be
following the Chinese model of economic systems by opening up Cuba's
economy without giving up rigid one-party political control. 130 He is
seen as "ruthless and compassionate, as an executioner and as an execu-
tive, as a rigid Communist and a practical manager of economic and se-
curity matters. ' 131 Unfortunately, this makes it unlikely that the reports
of human rights violations within the country will be met with any rem-
edy in the near future.132 Cuba is still holding 205 political prisoners,
including twenty-three dissident journalists, despite a few signs of an
'opening' since President Raul Castro came to power.133 This includes
the majority of seventy-five dissidents arrested during a three-day span in
March 2003 who were accused of either acting against the "integrity and
sovereignty of the state" or of collaborating with foreign media for the
purpose of "destabilizing the country.' 34 Most were convicted in one-
day trials and handed sentences that could leave some in prison for the
rest of their lives.135 If these policies continue, it is unlikely other coun-
tries will take great interest in renewed Cuban economy. It was the dep-
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can.com/archive/2007/november-december-magazine-contents/the-china-model.
128. Penn, supra note 33.
129. Raul Castro, supra note 68.
130. Id.
131. Id.
132. See Cuba: Fidel Castro's Abusive Machinery Remains Intact, HUMAN RIGHTS
WATCH, Feb. 18, 2008, http://www.hrw.org/en/news/2008/02/18/cuba-fidel-castro-s-
abusive-machinery-remains-intact?print
133. Reporters Without Borders, As UN Conducts Universal Periodic Review, 205 Polit-
ical Prisoners, Including 23 Journalists, Await Release, REFWORLD, Feb. 3, 2009,
available at http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/498ab62fa.html.
134. Carlos Lauria et al., Cuba's Long Black Spring, CPJ, Mar. 18, 2008, http://cpj.org/
reports/2008/03/cuba-press-crackdown.php.
135. Id.
2009] FAMILY TRADITION: RAUL CASTRO TAKES REIGNS 905
rivation of social liberties in the first place which sparked the United
States to sanction Cuba with such harsh economic penalties.
Raul has shown some signs of hope. "According to the non-govern-
mental Cuban Commission of Human Rights and National Reconcilia-
tion (CCDHRN), Cuba had 316 political prisoners when Raul Castro first
took power on a provisional basis in July 2006 .... By early 2008, when
Ratil Castro formally assumed the presidency, that number had declined
to 234."136 Only four days after officially taking office on February 29,
2008, he authorized the signing of the International Covenant on Civil
and Political Rights and the International Covenant on Economic, Social
and Cultural Rights. 137 These United Nations human rights treaties as-
sure the issuance of basic civil rights. The guarantees of the Covenant on
Civil and Political Rights include: freedom of religion, equal protection
under the law, self-determination, peaceful assembly, right to privacy,
and the right to exit the country. 138 The Covenant on Economic, Social
and Cultural Rights, on the other hand, promises citizens "the right to
employment, fair wages, trade union guarantees, access to social security,
education, and the 'highest attainable standard of physical and mental
health." 139 Now, a year after the ceremonial signing of these pacts, Cuba
has yet to complete the ratification and implementation of its guarantees.
It should be noted that Raul did oversee the ratification of the United
Nations Convention against Corruption, previously signed by the country
before he took office, an ambitious international resolution to prevent
and combat corruption.140
V. RECIPE FOR SUCCESS.. .OR DISASTER: FACTORS
DETERMINATIVE OF THE REFORM'S SUCCESS
Despite the meager chances of political change, many wonder if Raul
could be the new hope for Cuba's economy. While there appears to have
been a smooth transition between the Castro regimes, several outside fac-
tors are at play in determining Cuba's ability to see the new reforms
through. The age of "Raulism" will depend greatly on the people of
Cuba's reactions to transition, ability to cope with the slowing global
economy, gaining dependence from foreign aid, and success in establish-
ing bilateral relations with other countries, especially the United States.
136. STAFF TRIP REPORT TO THE COMM. ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, 111TH CONG.,
Changing Cuba Policy-In the United States National Interest (Comm. Print 111-
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A. CUBANS ADJUSTING
It was easy to see even in the beginning stages of his reign that Raul's
leadership style was far different than that of Fidel. As Brian Latell, au-
thor of the brothers' biography After Fidel, described Fidel as being the
visionary, but hopelessly disorganized, while "Raul has provided the or-
ganizational glue."' 141 As a child, Fidel lobbied their parents to send him
to the largest and most prestigious collegiate prep school on the island,
Belen, so that he could be in the country's capital. 142 Fidel succeeded in
almost everything Belen offered, especially in debate and oratory, com-
petitive sports, and mountaineering.143 Raul arrived at Belen later in the
same year Fidel left, but everything Fidel had done brilliantly, he did
badly. Raul was not athletic, demonstrated none of the leadership quali-
ties the Jesuits encouraged, was a terrible student and extremely with-
drawn. He was expelled within his first year and went on to continue his
education at a small military school.
Just as during their school years, Fidel's time in power was marked with
vibrant speeches, utilizing political rhetoric to persuade his followers as
well as enemies."44 He seemed to never tire from his podium while
speaking at public events, delivering speeches lasting up to seven hours at
a time.145 He was unusually charismatic and reveled in the limelight.146
Fidel was a pioneer at mastering the global medium of television in the
1960s, long before others.147 He also delegated little authority and relied
on himself to make the decisions. 48 On the other hand, Raul maintained
a low profile. He gave less than a handful of speeches during his year and
a half serving as interim president. 149 Fidel's predecessor takes a more
pragmatic approach and utilizes the opinions of others, even consulting
them for advice.' 50 During his stint as interim president, Raul worked
closely with a half-dozen experienced government officials in making de-
cisions to bounce ideas off of one another and gain other perspec-
tives-something unheard of to Fidel.' 51
That does not mean Raul is not tough or extremely well capable of
handling the clout after having controlled the three most powerful institu-
tions in Cuba-the military, the security services and the Communist
party. 152 In fact he earned himself the nickname "The Prussian" for his
cold, efficient style in serving as his brother's enforcer. 153 He even sent
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close friends to the firing squad.154 As Samuel Farber, a political scientist
who grew up in Cuba said, "Raul has a reputation for being more politi-
cally repressive than Fidel, but he is also more organized, more practical
and more of an executive than Fidel."1 55
So what impact will these differences in personalities carry for the is-
land? Some feel it means Raul will have to gain the peoples' support in
other ways. Raul "'lacks charisma, which Fidel has in abundance, and so
he has to deliver' on proposed reforms. ' 156 His open policy towards col-
laboration is likely to generate a more accurate consensus of what con-
cerns the citizens of Cuba really have, thus gaining him favor.
Despite the stark variance in the brothers' outlook on their country's
economy, the political succession from Fidel to Raul has been character-
ized by a political stability that is surprising to many. Even Raul himself
predicted that unrest would accompany the change. Upon Fidel stepping
down, Raul mobilized thousands of reservists and military troops to quell
a potential U.S. invasion. 157 He also reportedly dispatched undercover
security throughout the capital only to find the precaution unnecessary as
the Cubans went on with their day-to-day life.1 5 8 These measures proved
superfluous. The transition has not even prompted unrest among the rul-
ing elite, causing schisms to form and endangering Raul's new position.1 59
This unexpected acceptance could be due, in part, to the PCC's efforts
to bolster the idea that Fidel is still in charge. Raul is said to sit next to an
empty chair in parliament, ostensibly reserved for Fidel.160 His speeches
are submitted to Fidel for approval, even when he is diverging from the
established Communist policies. 161 Raul praises his brother from the lec-
tern-despite admitting some of his Socialist experiments have gone off
course, beginning and ending each speech with an update of everything
he has learned from his older brother. 16 2 Any policy change is hand-de-
livered to Fidel's sick bed.1 63 While Fidel has not been seen in public for
over two years, he continues to air his views through other mediums such
as the state-run newspaper.' 64
Without Fidel, some believe the new leaders' efforts to listen to the
concerns of the Cuban people and provide economic reform are the only
reasons Cuba has accepted their new leader. "People here are Fidelistas,
but not necessarily Socialistas," said an analyst in Havana who requested
to remain anonymous.165 He continued to say,"(without Fidel) Raul will
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have to renegotiate an agreement with the Cuban people."'1 66 But sci-
ence shows otherwise. The CIA actually conducted an exercise in the
first decade following the 1959 Cuban Revolution to distinguish between
"Fidelistas" and "Raulistas". 167 One U.S. Intelligence official reported,
"A graphic representation of who is close to Fidel and who is close to
Raul .. . can't be done. The circles so closely meet they are essentially
the same."'1 68 Still there is a possibility this study is antiquated and feel-
ings have shifted as Raul begins to develop and promote his differing
policies. There will also likely be strong reluctance on behalf of the
United States to lift the trade embargo so long as Fidel's presence is
strong in Cuba.' 69 Any attempts by President Obama to ease relations
with Cuba will be countered with the reaction of the large population of
Americans with Cuban descent who remain hostile about the real prop-
erty on the island that was confiscated by the Communist Castro
Regime. 170
While some believe that as long as Fidel is alive, he will continue inter-
fering with Raul's actions and very little will be gained, others argue Raul
is actually already practicing an "anti-Fidel" agenda only permitted due
to Fidel's poor health.171 It is unclear whether the truth will ever come
out.
B. DUEL CURRENCY
A major impediment Raul himself acknowledges is the dual currency
system-the marginal national peso and the CUC peso, or convertible pe-
sos equivalent to the U.S. dollar.172 The Cuban Peso (CUP) is the Cuban
currency to be used by Cubans in Cuba since 1914. The Cuban Converti-
ble Peso (CUC), known as the "Tourist Dollar," is legally the equivalent
to a synthetic dollar. The CUC was introduced in an attempt to draw
money functions away from the U.S. dollar, whose usage had almost
overtaken the peso since 1993 when the Cuban government decriminal-
ized the holding of U.S. dollars. 173 Cuba also legalized the use of the
Euro in 2002.174 As a result, the island developed a balkanized monetary
system consisting of a socialist peso-based economy, a marketized dollar
economy, and-to a much lesser extent-a Euro-economy. 175 This sys-
tem of duality creates two problems: inequality amongst Cuban citizens
and a barrier to foreign investors. "People who have access to U.S. dol-
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lars and Euros through employment in the tourist sector or from relatives
abroad live far better than ordinary Cubans.' 76 State workers and pen-
sioners are paid with local currency, but must buy most goods and ser-
vices in convertible pesos, worth an estimated twenty-four times more.' 77
Petitions have been submitted to the National Assembly demanding the
abolition of the convertible peso.1 7 8
While the centralized peso has helped to insulate the island from the
fluctuations in the global economy, Cuba needs to embrace one currency
system in order to facilitate the foreign investment necessary for the new
model economy and to ensure equality among its citizens. Rumors have
been circulating for over a year that Raul plans to do away with the dual
currency system. "Cuba will reform its monetary system as quickly as
possible," said the head of the Cuban parliament's economic commission,
Osvaldo Martinez.17 9 "The government's policy is to eliminate the dual
currency, which to some extent hurts the country's self-esteem, but we
need a minimum quantity of monetary reserves for a normal exchange
rate, prices and wages reform and greater economic efficiency," he said.
Having a single, dominant national currency would improve the Cuban
government's signaling capabilities by creating an intelligible medium-a
single currency-through which foreign investors could analyze potential
foreign investments. 180 One option would be dollarization, or the adop-
tion of the United States dollar as the country's national currency. This
option is very unlikely under the socialist regime because the transfer of
Cuba's monetary sovereignty to U.S. monetary authorities, whose rate
setting policies would then determine the island's interest rates, would
render Cuba's monetary apparatus irrelevant.1 81 Cuba would sacrifice all
seigniorage, the money earned by the sovereign from issuing currency,
generated from the issuance of pesos and convertible pesos, and would
also sacrifice the arbitrage profits that the government could earn by col-
lecting dollars for goods produced by peso-paid Cuban workers. 182 A
more probable option is de-dollarization or increased "pesoization,"
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which gives officials more formal control over the money supply and sig-
naling.183 In fact steps toward de-dollarization have already begun. In
2004, the Central Bank eliminated the use of the dollar as medium of
exchange, imposing ten percent surtax on converting dollars into convert-
ible pesos.184 In March 2005, the Central Bank devalued the exchange
rate for CUC against the CUP.185 Shortly thereafter, the Central Bank
abandoned parity between the U.S. dollar and the nonconvertible peso
effective April 9, 2005.186 A major impediment remains in that the Cu-
ban government retains the peso because it lacks sufficient foreign
reserves to back and circulate only CUCs.
Despite the push to restore the peso as the primary currency, Raul is
making efforts to ensure foreign investors are not discouraged. On July
16, 2003, the Central Bank decided to call in all foreign exchange held by
Cuban banking institutions and to impose licensing requirements on their
acquisition and use of foreign exchange. 187 Upset by the currency con-
trols imposed through this measure, foreign banks refused to honor con-
firmations of letters of credit issued by Cuban banks.188 In response,
Raul took unprecedented measures to maintain foreign investors, swiftly
enacting Resolution 68.189 The resolution was a state promise not to in-
terfere with a pre-existing contract, a reassurance to foreign lenders the
new measure would not block payment by Cuban banks to the confirming
banks. 190
C. ECONOMIC TROUBLES
The continued success of the economy following the reformations will
depend largely on the ability to act upon foreign investment opportuni-
ties. Raul is facing an uphill battle. Not only is he trying to uproot fifty
years of practices, his reform is not isolated from the plague of problems
faced by the rest of the world. Cuba has been somewhat isolated from
the lull in the global economy due to the socialist scheme but not com-
pletely protected. This vulnerability is apparent by Raul's move to slow
his economic changes in mid-July of 2008 in response to the dwindling
world market. 191
Having felt the impact first-hand, he is mindful of the turmoil faced by
Cuba's Communist comrade Russia in the 1990s due to their reforms, as
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well as the harsh socioeconomic impact the former Soviet Union's policy
changes carried for his own country. He knows that throwing open the
country to foreign capital after half a century of socialist reforms is not an
appropriate plan of action. 192 Instead, he desires to gradually open up
the system and its "excessive number of prohibitions."' 93 But he is not
taking the lessons of history to heart to the extent that is necessary. Raul
is leaving his country vulnerable through the strong reliance on other
countries' support for economic stability, not unlike the conditions pre-
sent when the Soviet Union fell. After the fall, Cuba was faced with fuel
deliveries and other essentials not arriving on time, if at all. 194 Street
crime reached all time highs. Hungry Cubans waited in interminable ra-
tion lines. 195 It is crucial that Raul establish economic independence
from countries like Venezuela and China to ensure the reformed island
can stand on its own.
Cuba has developed a strong reliance on Venezuelan business ventures
in every sector from oil, metal production, farm equipment, and health-
care support.196 There is no doubt this was in part due to President Hugo
Chavez's incredible fondness of Fidel Castro, whom he looked upon as a
"father". 197 The close relationship prompted him to underwrite the Cu-
ban economy, providing around $2 billion in annual aid.198 With his "fa-
ther" gone and his replacement invoking such bold policy changes, it is
unclear whether Chavez's generosity will continue. This deep-seeded de-
pendence on Venezuela takes power out of the hands of Raul and creates
a strong risk of others crippling the growth of the Cuban economy. It is
all too familiar to the turmoil of the former Soviet Union's withdrawal of
financial support from the Cuban regime just over a decade ago.
In an even more striking resemblance to the Soviet Union/Cuba rela-
tionship, China is serving as the economic backer behind Cuba's develop-
ing renewable energy sector. With China's support, Cuba plans to open
twenty-one power stations within the next five years, adding to its newly
founded station at Sancti Spiritus, which was funded by the Chinese. 99
While the backing has aided significantly in getting the country back on
its feet in a time of need following the storms, Raul must remember that
support is not in his control. The Chinese hold a powerful hand as the
economic shuffle progresses.
D. BILATERAL RELATIONS
With that caveat, it remains crucial the country is able to establish, or
re-establish, bilateral relations with global markets. Due in part to the
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severed relations attributable to Fidel, as well as the novelty and uncer-
tainty concerning the new regime, many problems lie ahead in making
this a reality, namely attracting investors and rebuilding an amiable rela-
tionship with the United States.
Investors are leery of the stability and threat of corruption in con-
ducting business with Raul's new Cuba. "The system [still] lacks the insti-
tutional mechanisms to manage the domestic bidding process and has
limited national experience conducting international bids. '200 The Cuban
government established the Cuban Central Bank in 1997.201 Studies
show, however, that the Bank is not free from government control and
hence, does not send a favorable investment signal to potential inves-
tors.20 2 Investors lack enough information about Cuba's creditworthiness
to make investment decisions, especially regarding uncollateralized
investments. 20 3
"No other departure from his brother's legacy would be as monumen-
tal for Raul as supporting a rapprochement with Washington. '20 4 The
economic embargo has been the centerpiece of American policy towards
Cuba since its imposition in 1960.205 Prior its implementation, the United
States was one of Cuba's biggest trading partners. The embargo began as
a ban on U.S. exports to Cuba except for food and medicine. It was ex-
tended on February 7, 1962, by President Kennedy to ban all imports
from Cuba to the United States, including the Cuban cigars for which
Kennedy had a special fondness.20 6 Currently, Cuban-Americans can
send up to $300 in cash every three months to relatives still on the island
and are only allowed to visit once every three years. 20 7 The embargo is
dual-track: while isolating Cuba through comprehensive economic sanc-
tions, including restrictions on trade and financial restrictions, the United
States provides support to the Cuban people through such measures as
funding for democracy and human rights projects, and U.S. government
sponsored broadcasting on the island.20 8 Still, in Fidel's opinion, the em-
bargo is "criminal," costing his country tens of billions of dollars. 20 9
Under the Bush administration, the U.S. government strengthened the
then thirty-eight year old embargo, passing the Cuban Liberty and Dem-
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ocratic Solidarity Act of 1996, also deemed the Helms-Burton Act.210
The Act extended the territorial application of the initial embargo to ap-
ply to foreign companies trading with Cuba, and penalized foreign com-
panies allegedly "trafficking" in property formerly owned by U.S. citizens
but expropriated by Cuba after the Cuban revolution.2 11 Furthermore,
the Act heightened the requirements for lifting the embargo by requiring
all the following conditions to be met: the establishment of a transition
Cuban government that does not include Fidel or Raul Castro; the legali-
zation of political activity; the release of all political prisoners; the cessa-
tion of Cuban interference with Radio and TV Marti broadcasts; and the
progressive steps by the country in establishing an independent judiciary
and respecting internationally recognized human rights.2 12 Also, in order
to terminate the embargo, Cuba would have to abide by all of the condi-
tions for a suspension as well as put an elected civilian government in
power.213 While many appreciate the Act, some feared the "strict legisla-
tive conditions could keep the United States from having any leverage or
influence as events unfold in a post-Fidel Cuba and as Cuba moves to-
ward a post-Raul Cuba. '2 14
When President George W. Bush came in to office, he aspired that the
"United States will help the people of Cuba realize the blessings of lib-
erty. ' 215 He long expressed disdain for the policies of Fidel Castro,
namely its harsh punishment policies against political revolutionists. "It
just breaks your heart to realize that people have been thrown in prisons
because they dare to speak out," he said.216 Both Houses have approved
legislative provisions over the past several years that would ease U.S.
sanctions on Cuba.2 17 Bush, however, regularly threatened to veto vari-
ous appropriations bills if they contained provisions weakening the em-
bargo. 21 8 As a result, all of these provisions were eventually removed
before the final passage of the associated legislation.21 9
Despite the callous attitude towards the Communist command, Bush
did try to prepare for a political transition in Cuba in hopes of re-estab-
lishing some sort of relationship with a post-Fidel regime. Twice, in 2004
and in 2006, the President ordered the Administration's Commission for
Assistance to a Free Cuba prepare reports detailing how the United
States could provide support during a Cuban transition government in
order to help it respond to humanitarian needs, conduct free and fair
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elections, and move toward a market-based economy. 220 The reports pre-
supposed however that Cuba would undergo a rapid democratic transi-
tion and did not entertain the possibility of reform under a communist
government.221 As Fidel's presidency neared an end, Bush expressed
hope, stating, "I view this as a period of transition and it should be the
beginning of the democratic transition in Cuba. '222
The attitude quickly changed, however, once the Bush Administration
saw democracy was not upon the horizon. Following Raul's official suc-
cession, the Administration was quick to rule out any immediate policy
changes, deriding Raul as 'dictator-like.' 2 3 "He is simply a continuation
of the Castro regime, a dictatorship," said State Department deputy
spokesman Tom Casey.224 Cuban Americans echoed the Department's
sentiments. "It matters nothing at all whether Fidel, Raul or any other
thug is named head of anything in Cuba," said Representative Lleana
Ros-Lehtinen, a Miami-area Republican.225 She continued, "What the
people want is freedom to vote in multiparty elections that are interna-
tionally supervised and freedom to express their dissent from the oppres-
sive regime. ' 226 Senator Robert Menendez, D-N.J., also of Cuban
descent, mirrored those sentiments "This does not represent the replace-
ment of totalitarianism with democracy. Instead, it is the replacement of
one dictator with another. '227
Many fear that in order for Raul's economic reform to succeed it will
require some relaxation of the forty-seven year-old U.S. trade em-
bargo.228 Winning a significant reduction or termination of the U.S. eco-
nomic embargo would gain him popularity with the military, with most
civilian leaders, and especially with the Cuban people.229 As such, he has
abandoned Fidel's tactic of harnessing anti-American sentiment to rally
Cubans, and has taken a much more accommodating approach with the
United States.230 A major obstacle remains in that the United States
passed a law in 1996 barring the government from dealing with Raul.2 3'
He has made several public offers to engage in dialogue with the United
States since taking office, but all have been denied. 232 Following Raul's
first public interview calling for normalizations of the relationship be-
tween Cuba and the United States in August of 2006, Assistant Secretary
of State for Western Hemisphere Affairs Thomas Shannon spoke on be-
half of the Bush Administration reiterating it was willing to work with
220. Id.
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Congress to lift U.S. economic sanctions, but only if Cuba were to begin a
transition to democracy. 233 According to Shannon, Cuba also had to be
prepared to free political prisoners, respect human rights, permit the cre-
ation of independent organizations, and create a mechanism and pathway
toward free and fair elections.2 3
4
Raul has joined his brother in expressing strong opposition to current
U.S. policy, describing it as "arrogant and interventionist". 235 The harsh
feelings towards the United States remain strong in Raul despite these
offerings of peace. He refused $1 million in aid offered by Washington to
help with the hurricane destruction, claiming the modest amount did not
even remotely approach Cuba's huge losses accrued due to the fifty year-
old trade embargo which he estimates total approximately $224.6 billion
in today's dollars.236 In the latter portion of the Bush administration,
however, Raul began to counter his frustrations with hopes of opening
negotiations with the next U.S. Administration. On July 26, 2007, the eve
of the fiftieth anniversary of the Cuban revolution, which put the more
than controversial Fidel Castro in to power and turned the country in to
Communism at the height of the Cold War, Raul appeared on state-run
television offering "to talk directly 'without intermediaries' and on equal
terms with [then] incoming U.S. President Barack Obama. '2 37 Raul
stated, "the new administration will have to decide whether it will keep
the absurd, illegal and failed policies against Cuba, or accept the olive
branch that we extended." 238 He went on to say "if the new U.S. authori-
ties put aside arrogance and decide to talk in a civilized manner, they will
be welcome. If not, we are willing to deal with their hostile policies, even
for another fifty years if necessary. '"239
Barack Obama was inaugurated President of the United States on Jan-
uary 20, 2009. Raul's proposal was met with open arms. In his first days
on the job, Obama ordered operations cease at Guantanamo Bay.240 The
order not only required closure within one year of the detention facility,
it also required U.S. government officials to review the status of each
detainee at Guantanamo to determine whether the government should
continue to hold the detainee, transfer or release him to a third country,
or prosecute him for criminal offenses.2 41 After a long run of U.S. Presi-
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dents backing the now forty-six year old trade embargo against Cuba,
President Obama's aspirations to normalize relations with the country
present a rare opportunity to say the least.2 42 It is especially surprising
coming on the heels of President George W. Bush's years in office spent
working to further isolate the Communist-run island.243 Throughout his
campaign, Obama promised to "grant Cuban Americans unrestricted
rights to visit family and send remittances to the island. ' 244 Although
prior to his run at the oval office he pushed ending the embargo, his re-
vamped political goal stated he would not "take off the embargo," but
would preserve it as "an important inducement for change." 245
The celebrations should not start yet. Both parties are being realistic
about the possibility of finding an end to the feud. Although Raul feels
Obama could "do a great deal" and "could take positive steps," he be-
lieves that the hopes the new U.S. President has raised in the rest of the
world may be "excessive. ' 246 The Cuban President explained "because
even if he's an honest man-and I believe he is-a sincere man-and I be-
lieve he is-one man alone cannot change the destiny of a country and
much less the United States. '2 47 In fact, Raul is not even satisfied with
the closing of Guantanamo. He wants Obama to give the base back to
Cuba without conditions, but the U.S. Administration indicates it will not
return the base without concessions. 248 With those thoughts in mind,
along with a reflection on the harsh U.S. treatment of his island over the
last fifty years, Raul qualified his gesture for talks with the United States
stating, "We are ready to do it whenever it may be, whenever they may
decide, without intermediaries, directly... [b]ut we are in no rush, we are
not desperate. '249
Now the new U.S. Administration has taken the reigns and the world
await what will transpire. There are two policy approaches the United
States could follow in responding to Raul Castro's succession. One op-
tion is a stay the course or status-quo approach that would maintain the
policy of isolating the Cuban government with comprehensive economic
sanctions.250 Advocates of this theory argue Raul's new Cuba is not new
at all and has not demonstrated any willingness to ease repression or initi-
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ate economic openings. 251 "The succession from Fidel to Raul is a preser-
vation of dictatorship," asserts secretary of Commerce Carlos
Gutierrez.25 2 Others are concerned that easing the embargo would pro-
long the communist regime by increasing money flowing into the state-
controlled enterprises.2 53 They argue continuing sanctions is the route to
keeping on the pressure to enact deeper economic reforms.254
The other would be an approach aimed at influencing Cuban govern-
ment and society through an easing of sanctions and increased contact
and engagement. 255 The main argument in support of this theory is based
on the notion that the United States needs to take advantage of Cuba's
political succession.256 They argue that continuing the status quo really
has no practical effect in encouraging policy change for Cuba, rather only
serves to guarantee more years of hostility between the two countries. 257
This group urges even the smallest reforms could help spur popular ex-
pectations for additional change. 258
Both of Obama's predecessors, Bush and Clinton, opted for the status
quo policy. Obama is living up to his campaign rhetoric calling for
'change.' Although extremely early in the game, it appears President
Obama is following the old verbiage "you can catch more bees with
honey than vinegar" in engaging the second policy approach and opening
long-awaited communications with Cuba. Congress is following suit.
Since Obama took the reigns, lawmakers have quietly introduced bills
that, if passed, would lift all travel restrictions on trips to Cuba by U.S.
citizens, a step that could inflict a decisive blow against the embargo. In a
more vocal move, on February 23, 2009, Senator Richard Lugar, the top
Republican on the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, issued a draft
report concluding Washington's unilateral embargo on the Caribbean na-
tion has been ineffective and should be reevaluated.2 59 The report argues
that the embargo has harmed U.S interests in the region and provided the
Cuban Government with a "convenient scapegoat" for its economic trou-
bles. 260 The report concludes that the embargo is no longer serving its
purpose, to serve as an incentive for negotiations with the Cuban govern-
ment to reform human rights and restore democracy. "This narrow ap-
proach ... has not furthered progress in human rights or democracy in
Cuba and has come at the expense of other direct and regional strategic
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U.S. interests. '261
It is important to note that while this is a step in mending relations, it is
not a call for an end to the trade and investment embargo, which Presi-
dent Obama has defended as an "inducement" for change in Cuba. "In-
stead, the reform agenda outlined by the report focuses on easing
restrictions on travel and the sale of agricultural goods, managing migra-
tion, and cooperating on drug-trafficking concerns, though the door will
be left open for bolder policy changes. '262
As an initial unilateral step, staff recommends fulfilling President
Obama's Campaign promise to repeal all restrictions on Cuban-
American family travel and remittances before the Fifth Summit of
the Americas in Trinidad and Tobago on April 19, 2009. The timing
of this gesture would signal an important change and would improve
goodwill towards the United States from Latin American countries,
as [the U.S.] seeks regional cooperation on a wide range of issues...
Today it is clear that a reform of our policy would serve U.S. security
and economic interests in managing migration effectively and com-
bating the illegal drug trade, among other interests. By seizing the
initiative at the beginning of a new U.S. Administration and at an
important moment in Cuban history, [the U.S. government] would
relinquish a conditional posture that has made any policy changes
contingent on Havana, not Washington. ' 263
It is clear a major factor in reevaluating the policy is the changing of
the guards. Lugar suggests that the recent changes in leadership in Wash-
ington and Havana provide a key opportunity to "reevaluate a complex
relationship marked by misunderstanding, suspicion, and open hostil-
ity."'264 Obama is no longer dependent on the Cuban-American vote as
Bush was, thus free to shape the U.S.-Cuba policy as he sees fit.265 Lugar
suggests under Raul, "decision-making relies on more regularized and
predictable channels such as the Cuban Communist Party, the National
Assembly, and government ministries. ' 266 Furthermore, the weakened
state of the economy plays a role because the government of Cuba no
longer represents the security threat to the United States that it once did.
"While Cuba's alliance with Venezuela has intentions of influencing re-
gional affairs, [it] has not been positioned to ably export its Revolution
since the collapse of the Soviet Union forced an end to Cuba's financial
support for Latin American guerrilla movements. ' 267
This strong support has already convinced President Obama to make
substantial policy changes toward Cuba beyond those he promised in his
campaign, namely lifting restrictions imposed by George W. Bush in
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2004.268 Many had predicted major policy reforms would be announced
prior to the Summit in mid-April, seeing it as an ideal time to unveil the
plan for a "new partnership" in the Americas.2 69 "Nothing would more
clearly signal the visionary intent of a young and forward-looking global
leader to open a new chapter in U.S. Latin American relations than a
change in Cuba policy," said William LeoGrande, a Cuba specialist and
dean of the School of Government at American University. He contin-
ues "it would be welcomed across the hemisphere, and enable us to work
together with our friends on a strategy to create a positive climate for
change in Cuba. '270 The President used the Summit to do just that. Days
before the Summit of the Americas, President Obama lifted all restric-
tions on the ability of individuals to visit relatives in Cuba, as well as to
send money to their families there.2 71 He pledged before leaders of
thirty-three other nations attending the Summit his hopes to "move U.S.-
Cuban relations in a new direction. '272 He avoided the tactics of his
predecessor, George W. Bush, keeping an uplifting tone instead of scold-
ing the Cuban government for holding political prisoners.27 3 He did not,
however, say that he was willing to support Cuba's membership in the
Organization of American States or lift the forty-seven year old trade
embargo against Cuba. Americans are still barred from sending gifts to
high-ranking Cuban government officials and Communist Party members
and travel restrictions remain in place for Americans of non-Cuban de-
scent.274 Still, this marks the most significant shift in U.S. policy towards
the island in half a century.
As far as American constituents are concerned, President Obama will
not be able to appease everyone. Many groups encourage relaxing the
restrictions, such as the business community. Jake Colvin, vice president
of the National Foreign Trade Council (NFTC), an association of several
hundred of the large U.S. multi-national companies, has called for the
"complete removal of all trade and travel restrictions on Cuba. '275 Some
Cuban Americans are also hopeful policies will be relaxed. "If Obama
does something to better Cuban relations, even if it's lifting travel restric-
tions or money restrictions or sending more aid, it would be an improve-
ment over what [the United States] has done for the last forty-seven years
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- which is nothing," says Fort Myers resident Juan Castillo.2 76 But that
does not mean all Cuban Americans have forgiven the Castro clan for the
pain and hardships endured. "The Cubans voted overwhelmingly against
Obama," said Daniel Erikson, director of Caribbean programs at the In-
ter-American Dialogue and author of The Cuba Wars. 277 In fact Obama
carried only thirty-five percent of the Cuban-American vote in Florida. 278
The community has generally taken a hard line against Castro's Cuba and
opposed efforts to ease sanctions on the island nation. 279 Relaxing the
embargo stands to enrage this large sect of the population. Many 'hard-
liners' remain steadfast in opposing legislation that will finance the pro-
longed existence of the Castro regime. "Much depends on the Obama's
attitude," said Leo Grande, who noted that the hard-liners had gained
some influence with new Democratic, as well as right-wing Republican
lawmakers in recent years who have accepted campaign funding from the
U.S.-Cuba Democracy PAC.280 Much criticism resulted from Obama
bypassing Congress to enact the policy reforms announced in April. As
Florida Representative Connie Mack said, Obama "should not make any
unilateral change in America's policy toward Cuba. Instead, Congress
should vigorously debate these and other ideas before any substantive
policy changes are implemented."'2 81
The European Union has set a lead for the United States to follow,
lifting its diplomatic sanctions against Cuba in 2003.282 The sanctions
were meant to punish Cuba for its poor human rights record. Upon the
solidification of bilateral cooperation agreements in the human rights
front, the European Union has opened the door to financial and commer-
cial arrangements with the island.283 The United Nations has also long
supported open trade with Cuba, urging the dissolution of the U.S. trade
embargo for the last sixteen years. 284 President Obama just may be the
man to listen to their plea.
VI. FUTURE
In light of the reforms announced at the 2009 Summit of the Americas,
the focus has shifted to the Communist Party's Sixth National Congress.
Cuba's next Communist party congress is scheduled for late 2009.285 The
meeting brings a possibility for broader policy changes including foreign
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investment, further land restructuring, and perhaps increased private bus-
iness ownership. 286
286. Id.
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